Very good! Let me try something else, based on your model:
1#. Whatever is created ex nihilo is logically dependent on Consciousness in every respect.
2#. Whatever is created ex nihilo is not constituted of or from anything further.
3#. Whatever is not constituted of or from anything further is logically independent in that respect.
4#. Whatever is logically independent in any respect is not logically dependent in every respect.
This is Not a Tautology, because ‘independent in ANY’ is not the opposite of ‘dependent in EVERY’. The opposite of ‘dependent in EVERY’ is ‘dependent in not-EVERY’ or ‘independent in not-none’, but “anything further” in 3# could be None (no other respect is possible because there is nothing apart from consciousness).
5#. Therefore, creation ex nihilo is not disproven.
In short, there is a leap from 3 to 4, which assumes that there is something further that creation could dependent on, but this begs the question.
EDIT: There is another error. Being ‘dependent on something in every respect’ is not contradicted by ‘not being dependent on anything else’ (or being independent of everything else); these statements are logically equivalent. The contradiction would arise only if something were dependent in every respect on X but also dependent in some respect on Y.
Thanks for this. I found it a little hard to follow but I’ve tried to reformulate the argument to remove those weaknesses:
1. Whatever is created ex nihilo is logically dependent on God in every respect.
2. Whatever is created ex nihilo is not constituted of or from anything other than itself.
3. Whatever is not constituted of or from anything other than itself is logically independent in that respect (call this constitutive independence).
4. Whatever is logically independent in at least one respect is not logically dependent in every respect.
5. Therefore, whatever is created ex nihilo is both logically dependent in every respect (from 1) and not logically dependent in every respect (from 2–4).
6. Nothing can be both logically dependent in every respect and not logically dependent in every respect.
6. Therefore, nothing can be created ex nihilo.
Do you see any problems with this?
Also, what’s the other argument against creation ex nihilo? I’d love to check it out!
The problem is ambiguity introduced at 4. It carries through to the conclusion by abandoning the reference to ‘God’ and ‘anything other’.
Being dependent on God in every respect is logically consistent and implies independence on everything else in every respect.
At 6, ‘nothing can be both logically dependent (on God) in every respect and not logically dependent (on God) in every respect’, and ‘something can be both logically dependent on God in every respect and not logically dependent on anything else in every respect’. The ambiguity allows two possibilities: it can be nothing or it can be something (not-nothing), therefore contradiction.
Those who claim creation ex nihilo also typically claim that nothing transcends God, but these claims are self-defeating. That which is created ex nihilo necessarily transcends God - otherwise, the claim would be creation ex deus, but that is also rejected as it equates to pantheism. It’s the same argument you make but in terms of ontological dependency.
Christianity is long past due in rejecting creation ex nihilo, but it can’t because it’s a foundational piece in the fragile house of cards.
I like the way you put that in terms of transcendence. If transcendence is all about “being wholly other” then this might be a clearer way of making the argument. One of the challenges I’ve had is stating the problem in terms that Christians don’t just reject.
I agree. In order to argue in the Christian arena, it’s best to use the Christian language.
Most Christians don’t examine their fundamental beliefs. Christianity is ultimately a philosophy, so it must also be examined as such to see if it actually holds water. Unfortunately, upon close inspection, much of it does not, at least without some serious revision - or development (gasp!).
If Christianity was coherent it would teach pantheism, but it does not. The Christian teaching of creation ex nihilo is panentheistic, at best. Christianity teaches that there is an infinite ontological gap between God and man (and all of creation). This is the dualistic foundation of the Incarnation doctrines, as well. Alternatively, creation ex Deo is pantheistic.
Responding to your main part I would actually disagree that Christianity rejects creation ex Deo. It rejects pantheism, but it also affirms pantheism because pantheism is a bit of an obscure and vacuous term. Christian theologians affirm that creation exists in God in virtue, see St. Maximus the Confessor’s logi doctrine, St. Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of ideas (which he gets from Pseudo-Dionysus) or Sergei Bulgakov and the sophiologists doctrine of Sophia.
Metaphysical independence is a broad church. It includes all sorts of things like causal independence, material independence, mereological independence, constitutive independence, ontological independence. So no equivocation here. I’m using it in such a way that it includes every kind of metaphysical independence.
In classical Christian metaphysics, “metaphysical dependence” understands God as the absolute ontological ground of all being. To be created ex nihilo means to depend entirely and continuously on God’s will and power for one’s being. There is no partiality in that dependence—it is total.
However, constitutive independence, such as “not being made out of any prior material,” does not imply any degree of independence from God’s sustaining and creative power. It only implies non-material dependence.
Thus, constitutive independence ≠ metaphysical independence in the same sense used in premise 1.
It doesn’t need to be the same sense exactly so long as one is a subset of another. Like if I argue that I’m not in England (wide scope) it’s follows that I can’t be in London (narrow scope).
Constitutive independence is a subset of metaphysical independence broadly speaking, and that’s why the argument works (in my opinion).
Since the universe isn’t constituted of God, there is a real sense in which Gods creative act doesn’t explain or ground creation. I’m on the fence between pantheism and panentheism, so I think that the universe is made of God in some sense. So there is no explanatory gap. Creatio ex nihilo ultimately rejects that material grounding, meaning that the universe is independent in *that* sense. So there is at least one way that the universe is metaphysically independent given creatio ex nihilo.
This is a category mistake. In classical Christian metaphysics, metaphysical independence refers to aseity—self-existence—which belongs to God alone (cf. Acts 17:28: "for in Him we live and move and exist"). All created things, by virtue of being created, lack aseity and are thus metaphysically dependent, regardless of the material or immaterial mode of creation.
Constitutive independence simply means creation was not made out of pre-existing materials (e.g., not a demiurgic fashion or from God's own substance, as in pantheism/panentheism). But this does not entail any independence from God's act of ontological grounding.
To say that because the universe is not constituted from God, therefore it's metaphysically independent "in that sense," is to confuse material composition with ontological grounding. One can be constituted independently of God’s being (i.e., not made of God), but still be wholly dependent on God for existence.
It is also theologically and metaphysically false. The very doctrine of creatio ex nihilo affirms that God’s will and power are sufficient causes of the universe’s existence. The lack of material causality (i.e., no pre-existing stuff) heightens the dependence of creation on God, rather than weakening it.
Efficient cause: God
Material cause: none
Final cause: God’s glory
So, the absence of a material cause increases, rather than decreases, the role of God’s creative act as the complete explanation for creation’s existence. There is no explanatory gap.
Okay, so my argument runs deeper than you think. I’m arguing that God’s creative act doesn’t ground the material of the universe, because it is materially independent (to use terms from a previous formulation of the argument).
The materiality of the universe lacks a material explanation/ lacks material grounding/ is materially ungrounded, because there is no other material that it is grounded in. On my view, the universe is fully grounded in the divine substance. Creatio ex nihilo denies this, thereby denying the material grounding of the universe. So, the universe is materially independent. I’m aiming to get at the same concept without using classical theological terminology, but it seems as though that might be causing confusion.
If something is constitutively basic (as the universe is given CEN) then it is consitutively independent, I.e. what the universe is constituted of is independent of God. If you grant independence, then there is at least one teeny tiny sense in which the universe doesn’t depend on God. Or you deny independence, and land in some kind of theistic monism.
The kitchen I built over the weekend isn’t fully grounded in my creative acts because if I don’t use any material, then I am just acting without forming anything- I contend that it’s the same situation for God due to the lack of the right kind of dependence. To say the materiality of the universe can be grounded in a mere efficient causal act is a category error.
There is an explanatory gap for CEN. There is a hard problem of mater for CEN.
You’re making a category error. In creatio ex nihilo, God’s creative act doesn’t need material grounding to be explanatory. The absence of a material cause doesn’t mean the universe is independent—it means it’s entirely dependent on God’s efficient causality for its existence. Material ungroundedness isn’t a form of metaphysical independence; it’s the result of God’s sovereign act of creating being from nothing. The “hard problem of matter” only arises if you assume matter requires prior material to be explained—which CEN explicitly denies.
Theologically, your view undermines the Creator-creature distinction—a core doctrine in classical Christian theism. There is no exchange or sharing of substance between God and creation. Creatio ex nihilo preserves this by affirming that God creates without using Himself or anything else. The universe’s being is entirely contingent, grounded solely in God’s will and power, not in any shared material or essence. To say the universe is “made of God” collapses the distinction and drifts into panentheism or worse.
The hardware/software analogy might seem helpful at first glance—it suggests that creation (the software) is entirely dependent on God (the hardware) to exist and operate. But on closer examination, it doesn’t really hold up under the weight of classical Christian metaphysics.
The core issue is that this analogy risks placing God and creation within the same ontological frame—as if God were just the underlying system that powers the universe. But in classical theism, God is not the “platform” on which the universe runs. He’s not a more powerful part of the same structure. He is Being itself—ipsum esse subsistens—utterly distinct from all that is made.
God isn’t just the necessary support for creation like a motherboard running code. He is the One by whom all things exist at every moment. As Paul says, “for in Him we live and move and exist” (Acts 17:28). That doesn’t just mean we rely on Him to get started—it means we don’t draw a single breath apart from His will.
Also, hardware is passive. Once the software is running, the hardware just sits there and lets it run. But God is not passive. His creative act isn’t a one-time push of a button; it’s a continual, active sustaining of all things (cf. Hebrews 1:3, “upholding all things by the word of His power”). Creation exists only because God wills it to exist, moment by moment.
There’s another danger here too: the analogy subtly leans toward deism—the idea that God kickstarted the universe but now just lets it run on its own. But Scripture doesn’t allow for that. The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo teaches that there was no pre-existing matter, no raw materials. God didn’t assemble the universe out of something else; He spoke, and it was. That kind of creation implies radical, ongoing dependence, not any kind of independence.
Saying that creation is metaphysically independent just because it’s not made from God is a category mistake. You’re confusing composition with grounding. Yes, creation isn’t made out of God’s own being (which rules out pantheism and panentheism), but that doesn’t mean it’s self-sustaining. It’s still entirely dependent on God for its existence.
If you’re looking for a better analogy, something like an author and his story gets closer to the mark. The characters in the story aren’t made from the author’s substance, but they depend entirely on him to exist, to act, even to be intelligible. Still, even that falls short.
So while the hardware/software analogy might help in casual conversation, it’s ultimately misleading. It fails to reflect the absolute Creator-creature distinction and the deep, ongoing dependence of all things on God’s will and power. Creation doesn’t run on God—it exists because of God.
Compelling argument, and I agree that creatio ex nihilo as presented here is contradictory. In my understanding, however, the point of creatio ex nihilo is not that God creates the world from some abyss, but rather that there is no other material outside of Himself that He uses to form the world. The argument is made more to combat Gnostic ideas of a demiurge forming the world from some other stuff. Placing creatio ex nihilo in opposition to creatio ex deo, as some theologians are wont to do, is in my view a false dichotomy arising from a misunderstanding of the relationship expressed here by the word “ex”: it’s not that the world is coming “from nothing” in the way that a child comes from its mother’s womb, but rather that there is no other created stuff (no “thing”) from which God forms creation.
What makes more sense to me is St. Maximus’s doctrine of creation as incarnation, as Dr. Jordan Daniel Wood proposes in his book, The Whole Mystery of Christ, which I am currently reading. Also, in his book The Orthodox Way, Fr. Kallistos explicitly calls Christianity panentheistic. Fr. Bulgakov’s doctrine of Sophia is another approach that seems promising, although I have not yet read any of his works. Palamite conceptions of God as essence and energies also could be interpreted in a “creatio ex deo” light. At least that seems to be how Fr. Kallistos understands it:
For the Palamite theologian the act of creation is nothing else than the continuing reality of God’s indwelling. Yet while permeating the created universe through his energies, God also transcends the universe in his ineffable essence, which remains forever unknowable alike to angels and to humankind, both in this present age and in the age to come. Palamas is in this way a maximalist: the whole God is radically transcendent in his essence, and the whole God is radically immanent in his omnipresent energies.
— God Immanent Yet Transcendent: The Divine Energies According to St. Gregory Palamas, Fr. Kallistos Ware
I found that last quote from a series of essays by one of my favorite theologians, Fr. Aidan Kimel, called “Creatio Ex Nihilo: Alternative Proposals”, when Googling to try to find that quote from Fr. Kallistos. There are some interesting ideas in there, especially creatio ex amore, which for me seems to essentially equate to creatio ex deo, since, as we know from 1 John 4:8, “God is love”. From my understanding, all of these—creatio ex nihilo, creatio ex deo, creatio ex amore—are different ways to express the same idea, even if the grammatical parallels are a bit shaky, which I will express in an apophatic way: God creates not from anything outside of Himself.
I’m not learned enough in metaphysical jargon to be sure of myself, but point 3 seems wrong to me. How can creation be constitutively independent when it is dependent on God to exist? When you write “Whatever is not constituted of (or from) anything further is constitutively independent” what do you mean by “further”? Further than being created by God? Or further than being an explanation for itself in and of itself?
Re your first question, exactly! I personally deny that premise, and that lands me in some kind of pantheism or panentheism - I think affirming either of these two models of God involves rejecting the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. Yet creatio ex nihilo requires that the universe is wholly dependent of on God - and that’s where I think the contradiction arises.
By “further” I mean it’s not constituted of God or anything else. I believe the universe IS constituted of God is some sense. I hope that helps!
You don't understand creation out of nothing. Can you tell me something truly original? What can humans think about that came from nothing? Fire can be found in lighting strikes and volcanos, the wheel can be seen in rolling logs and rocks, animals have a rudiment of language.
There's a reason it's an article of faith and not a proposition in this or that philosophical set of abstract concepts. The speculative "knowledge" in this modern sense, as is known to intellectuals and philosopher, is not akin to the trascendental Knowledge you're truly seeking.
All I gather from your text is that you can't conceive creation out of nothing therefore it's not real.
Creating out of nothing is not causality.
The first "creatura ex nihilo" is The Law of Causality. This was the first cause and the first effect. The first act, before actions were a thing; an act of inventiveness that while being invented invented inventiveness. How can humans even speak of this?
*What caused causality if causality must have been caused for causality to have been caused?*
There was no “before logic” - logic has always existed, grounded in God. I think once you understand what it means for one thing to depend on another, it turns out that the universe both does and doesn’t depend on God, constitutively.
The universe must be fully dependent on God given creation ex nihilo because God is the only being for things possibly be grounded in. Yet, if the universe doesn’t constitutively depend on God, then the universe is independent of God in *that* respect. So there is one way in which the universe is not dependent on God. So the universe is fully dependent on God and not fully dependent on God.
Contradictions are not things we should want to be committed to. So best off ditching creation ex nihilo. Other models of God are available and should be preferred on this basis- like pantheism and panentheism
I don’t think anyone can conceive of creation from nothing, and that’s part of the problem. People can state it, sure. But I’m confident that the doctrine is incoherent. I think the doctrine arose in the first instance because of some pseudo problems about the creator/creature distinction that we are better off ignoring.
If you disagree with my argument then I’m happy to take substantive disagreement seriously. But cheap shots like “you don’t understand x” without engaging with the argument won’t fly here. I understand it just fine!
God created all things visible and invisible, including logic. How can you talk of metaphysical dependencies while talking about operations that occur to create such concepts? What can you logically say about that which happened before logic was a thing?
You've hit the limit of logical thinking. It's your call if you want to keep manipulating sets of abstract symbols or if you want to actually know something.
I *grant* those things for arguments sake, but you don’t need to assume any of those things for the argument to work. An atheist (who might disagree with all of those) can still run the argument because it is an internal critique of a certain kind of theism.
Are you defending creation ex nihilo here or are you rejecting theism? I can’t tell from your last comment.
It sounds like you reject philosophical metaphysics as a discipline. No worries, happy to agree to disagree there. This argument is analytic so it’s the kind of thing that’s supposed to be true or false by definition. You don’t need anything other than definitions to run an argument like this.
I still don’t know if you’re objecting because you think God can create stuff ex nihilo, or if you’re coming from an atheistic angle.
Very good! Let me try something else, based on your model:
1#. Whatever is created ex nihilo is logically dependent on Consciousness in every respect.
2#. Whatever is created ex nihilo is not constituted of or from anything further.
3#. Whatever is not constituted of or from anything further is logically independent in that respect.
4#. Whatever is logically independent in any respect is not logically dependent in every respect.
This is Not a Tautology, because ‘independent in ANY’ is not the opposite of ‘dependent in EVERY’. The opposite of ‘dependent in EVERY’ is ‘dependent in not-EVERY’ or ‘independent in not-none’, but “anything further” in 3# could be None (no other respect is possible because there is nothing apart from consciousness).
5#. Therefore, creation ex nihilo is not disproven.
In short, there is a leap from 3 to 4, which assumes that there is something further that creation could dependent on, but this begs the question.
EDIT: There is another error. Being ‘dependent on something in every respect’ is not contradicted by ‘not being dependent on anything else’ (or being independent of everything else); these statements are logically equivalent. The contradiction would arise only if something were dependent in every respect on X but also dependent in some respect on Y.
Thanks for this. I found it a little hard to follow but I’ve tried to reformulate the argument to remove those weaknesses:
1. Whatever is created ex nihilo is logically dependent on God in every respect.
2. Whatever is created ex nihilo is not constituted of or from anything other than itself.
3. Whatever is not constituted of or from anything other than itself is logically independent in that respect (call this constitutive independence).
4. Whatever is logically independent in at least one respect is not logically dependent in every respect.
5. Therefore, whatever is created ex nihilo is both logically dependent in every respect (from 1) and not logically dependent in every respect (from 2–4).
6. Nothing can be both logically dependent in every respect and not logically dependent in every respect.
6. Therefore, nothing can be created ex nihilo.
Do you see any problems with this?
Also, what’s the other argument against creation ex nihilo? I’d love to check it out!
The problem is ambiguity introduced at 4. It carries through to the conclusion by abandoning the reference to ‘God’ and ‘anything other’.
Being dependent on God in every respect is logically consistent and implies independence on everything else in every respect.
At 6, ‘nothing can be both logically dependent (on God) in every respect and not logically dependent (on God) in every respect’, and ‘something can be both logically dependent on God in every respect and not logically dependent on anything else in every respect’. The ambiguity allows two possibilities: it can be nothing or it can be something (not-nothing), therefore contradiction.
The other argument I mentioned is here, but I am no longer sure whether it holds for creation by consciousness (because consciousness includes the concept of time) : https://michaelkowalik.substack.com/p/proof-that-emergence-of-something-out-of-nothing-is-impossible
Those who claim creation ex nihilo also typically claim that nothing transcends God, but these claims are self-defeating. That which is created ex nihilo necessarily transcends God - otherwise, the claim would be creation ex deus, but that is also rejected as it equates to pantheism. It’s the same argument you make but in terms of ontological dependency.
Christianity is long past due in rejecting creation ex nihilo, but it can’t because it’s a foundational piece in the fragile house of cards.
I like the way you put that in terms of transcendence. If transcendence is all about “being wholly other” then this might be a clearer way of making the argument. One of the challenges I’ve had is stating the problem in terms that Christians don’t just reject.
I agree. In order to argue in the Christian arena, it’s best to use the Christian language.
Most Christians don’t examine their fundamental beliefs. Christianity is ultimately a philosophy, so it must also be examined as such to see if it actually holds water. Unfortunately, upon close inspection, much of it does not, at least without some serious revision - or development (gasp!).
I’m going to be pedantic and say it’s ex Deo not ex Deus. Deus is the nominative but we need the dative/ablative case.
Thanks. I don’t sprechen die Latin.
Ego te absolvo a peccatum tua in nomine Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti.
If Christianity was coherent it would teach pantheism, but it does not. The Christian teaching of creation ex nihilo is panentheistic, at best. Christianity teaches that there is an infinite ontological gap between God and man (and all of creation). This is the dualistic foundation of the Incarnation doctrines, as well. Alternatively, creation ex Deo is pantheistic.
Responding to your main part I would actually disagree that Christianity rejects creation ex Deo. It rejects pantheism, but it also affirms pantheism because pantheism is a bit of an obscure and vacuous term. Christian theologians affirm that creation exists in God in virtue, see St. Maximus the Confessor’s logi doctrine, St. Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of ideas (which he gets from Pseudo-Dionysus) or Sergei Bulgakov and the sophiologists doctrine of Sophia.
Muchas gracias!
The term “metaphysical independence” is being used equivocally:
In premise 1: “metaphysical dependence” refers to ontological dependence on God.
In premise 4: “metaphysical independence” is inferred from a lack of material composition, which does not equate to ontological independence from God.
This argument is logically valid in form but unsound, because at least one premise is false or equivocates
Metaphysical independence is a broad church. It includes all sorts of things like causal independence, material independence, mereological independence, constitutive independence, ontological independence. So no equivocation here. I’m using it in such a way that it includes every kind of metaphysical independence.
In classical Christian metaphysics, “metaphysical dependence” understands God as the absolute ontological ground of all being. To be created ex nihilo means to depend entirely and continuously on God’s will and power for one’s being. There is no partiality in that dependence—it is total.
However, constitutive independence, such as “not being made out of any prior material,” does not imply any degree of independence from God’s sustaining and creative power. It only implies non-material dependence.
Thus, constitutive independence ≠ metaphysical independence in the same sense used in premise 1.
It doesn’t need to be the same sense exactly so long as one is a subset of another. Like if I argue that I’m not in England (wide scope) it’s follows that I can’t be in London (narrow scope).
Constitutive independence is a subset of metaphysical independence broadly speaking, and that’s why the argument works (in my opinion).
Since the universe isn’t constituted of God, there is a real sense in which Gods creative act doesn’t explain or ground creation. I’m on the fence between pantheism and panentheism, so I think that the universe is made of God in some sense. So there is no explanatory gap. Creatio ex nihilo ultimately rejects that material grounding, meaning that the universe is independent in *that* sense. So there is at least one way that the universe is metaphysically independent given creatio ex nihilo.
This is a category mistake. In classical Christian metaphysics, metaphysical independence refers to aseity—self-existence—which belongs to God alone (cf. Acts 17:28: "for in Him we live and move and exist"). All created things, by virtue of being created, lack aseity and are thus metaphysically dependent, regardless of the material or immaterial mode of creation.
Constitutive independence simply means creation was not made out of pre-existing materials (e.g., not a demiurgic fashion or from God's own substance, as in pantheism/panentheism). But this does not entail any independence from God's act of ontological grounding.
To say that because the universe is not constituted from God, therefore it's metaphysically independent "in that sense," is to confuse material composition with ontological grounding. One can be constituted independently of God’s being (i.e., not made of God), but still be wholly dependent on God for existence.
It is also theologically and metaphysically false. The very doctrine of creatio ex nihilo affirms that God’s will and power are sufficient causes of the universe’s existence. The lack of material causality (i.e., no pre-existing stuff) heightens the dependence of creation on God, rather than weakening it.
Efficient cause: God
Material cause: none
Final cause: God’s glory
So, the absence of a material cause increases, rather than decreases, the role of God’s creative act as the complete explanation for creation’s existence. There is no explanatory gap.
Okay, so my argument runs deeper than you think. I’m arguing that God’s creative act doesn’t ground the material of the universe, because it is materially independent (to use terms from a previous formulation of the argument).
The materiality of the universe lacks a material explanation/ lacks material grounding/ is materially ungrounded, because there is no other material that it is grounded in. On my view, the universe is fully grounded in the divine substance. Creatio ex nihilo denies this, thereby denying the material grounding of the universe. So, the universe is materially independent. I’m aiming to get at the same concept without using classical theological terminology, but it seems as though that might be causing confusion.
If something is constitutively basic (as the universe is given CEN) then it is consitutively independent, I.e. what the universe is constituted of is independent of God. If you grant independence, then there is at least one teeny tiny sense in which the universe doesn’t depend on God. Or you deny independence, and land in some kind of theistic monism.
The kitchen I built over the weekend isn’t fully grounded in my creative acts because if I don’t use any material, then I am just acting without forming anything- I contend that it’s the same situation for God due to the lack of the right kind of dependence. To say the materiality of the universe can be grounded in a mere efficient causal act is a category error.
There is an explanatory gap for CEN. There is a hard problem of mater for CEN.
Incase you’re interested:
https://open.substack.com/pub/doubtology/p/why-creation-ex-nihilo-is-incoherent?r=3etv8w&utm_medium=ios
You’re making a category error. In creatio ex nihilo, God’s creative act doesn’t need material grounding to be explanatory. The absence of a material cause doesn’t mean the universe is independent—it means it’s entirely dependent on God’s efficient causality for its existence. Material ungroundedness isn’t a form of metaphysical independence; it’s the result of God’s sovereign act of creating being from nothing. The “hard problem of matter” only arises if you assume matter requires prior material to be explained—which CEN explicitly denies.
Theologically, your view undermines the Creator-creature distinction—a core doctrine in classical Christian theism. There is no exchange or sharing of substance between God and creation. Creatio ex nihilo preserves this by affirming that God creates without using Himself or anything else. The universe’s being is entirely contingent, grounded solely in God’s will and power, not in any shared material or essence. To say the universe is “made of God” collapses the distinction and drifts into panentheism or worse.
"One can be constituted independently of God's being, but still be wholly dependent on God for existence"
Could I make an analogy comparing God to the hardware and existence (in the material sense) to the software?
The hardware/software analogy might seem helpful at first glance—it suggests that creation (the software) is entirely dependent on God (the hardware) to exist and operate. But on closer examination, it doesn’t really hold up under the weight of classical Christian metaphysics.
The core issue is that this analogy risks placing God and creation within the same ontological frame—as if God were just the underlying system that powers the universe. But in classical theism, God is not the “platform” on which the universe runs. He’s not a more powerful part of the same structure. He is Being itself—ipsum esse subsistens—utterly distinct from all that is made.
God isn’t just the necessary support for creation like a motherboard running code. He is the One by whom all things exist at every moment. As Paul says, “for in Him we live and move and exist” (Acts 17:28). That doesn’t just mean we rely on Him to get started—it means we don’t draw a single breath apart from His will.
Also, hardware is passive. Once the software is running, the hardware just sits there and lets it run. But God is not passive. His creative act isn’t a one-time push of a button; it’s a continual, active sustaining of all things (cf. Hebrews 1:3, “upholding all things by the word of His power”). Creation exists only because God wills it to exist, moment by moment.
There’s another danger here too: the analogy subtly leans toward deism—the idea that God kickstarted the universe but now just lets it run on its own. But Scripture doesn’t allow for that. The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo teaches that there was no pre-existing matter, no raw materials. God didn’t assemble the universe out of something else; He spoke, and it was. That kind of creation implies radical, ongoing dependence, not any kind of independence.
Saying that creation is metaphysically independent just because it’s not made from God is a category mistake. You’re confusing composition with grounding. Yes, creation isn’t made out of God’s own being (which rules out pantheism and panentheism), but that doesn’t mean it’s self-sustaining. It’s still entirely dependent on God for its existence.
If you’re looking for a better analogy, something like an author and his story gets closer to the mark. The characters in the story aren’t made from the author’s substance, but they depend entirely on him to exist, to act, even to be intelligible. Still, even that falls short.
So while the hardware/software analogy might help in casual conversation, it’s ultimately misleading. It fails to reflect the absolute Creator-creature distinction and the deep, ongoing dependence of all things on God’s will and power. Creation doesn’t run on God—it exists because of God.
Compelling argument, and I agree that creatio ex nihilo as presented here is contradictory. In my understanding, however, the point of creatio ex nihilo is not that God creates the world from some abyss, but rather that there is no other material outside of Himself that He uses to form the world. The argument is made more to combat Gnostic ideas of a demiurge forming the world from some other stuff. Placing creatio ex nihilo in opposition to creatio ex deo, as some theologians are wont to do, is in my view a false dichotomy arising from a misunderstanding of the relationship expressed here by the word “ex”: it’s not that the world is coming “from nothing” in the way that a child comes from its mother’s womb, but rather that there is no other created stuff (no “thing”) from which God forms creation.
What makes more sense to me is St. Maximus’s doctrine of creation as incarnation, as Dr. Jordan Daniel Wood proposes in his book, The Whole Mystery of Christ, which I am currently reading. Also, in his book The Orthodox Way, Fr. Kallistos explicitly calls Christianity panentheistic. Fr. Bulgakov’s doctrine of Sophia is another approach that seems promising, although I have not yet read any of his works. Palamite conceptions of God as essence and energies also could be interpreted in a “creatio ex deo” light. At least that seems to be how Fr. Kallistos understands it:
For the Palamite theologian the act of creation is nothing else than the continuing reality of God’s indwelling. Yet while permeating the created universe through his energies, God also transcends the universe in his ineffable essence, which remains forever unknowable alike to angels and to humankind, both in this present age and in the age to come. Palamas is in this way a maximalist: the whole God is radically transcendent in his essence, and the whole God is radically immanent in his omnipresent energies.
— God Immanent Yet Transcendent: The Divine Energies According to St. Gregory Palamas, Fr. Kallistos Ware
I found that last quote from a series of essays by one of my favorite theologians, Fr. Aidan Kimel, called “Creatio Ex Nihilo: Alternative Proposals”, when Googling to try to find that quote from Fr. Kallistos. There are some interesting ideas in there, especially creatio ex amore, which for me seems to essentially equate to creatio ex deo, since, as we know from 1 John 4:8, “God is love”. From my understanding, all of these—creatio ex nihilo, creatio ex deo, creatio ex amore—are different ways to express the same idea, even if the grammatical parallels are a bit shaky, which I will express in an apophatic way: God creates not from anything outside of Himself.
I’m not learned enough in metaphysical jargon to be sure of myself, but point 3 seems wrong to me. How can creation be constitutively independent when it is dependent on God to exist? When you write “Whatever is not constituted of (or from) anything further is constitutively independent” what do you mean by “further”? Further than being created by God? Or further than being an explanation for itself in and of itself?
Re your first question, exactly! I personally deny that premise, and that lands me in some kind of pantheism or panentheism - I think affirming either of these two models of God involves rejecting the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. Yet creatio ex nihilo requires that the universe is wholly dependent of on God - and that’s where I think the contradiction arises.
By “further” I mean it’s not constituted of God or anything else. I believe the universe IS constituted of God is some sense. I hope that helps!
You don't understand creation out of nothing. Can you tell me something truly original? What can humans think about that came from nothing? Fire can be found in lighting strikes and volcanos, the wheel can be seen in rolling logs and rocks, animals have a rudiment of language.
There's a reason it's an article of faith and not a proposition in this or that philosophical set of abstract concepts. The speculative "knowledge" in this modern sense, as is known to intellectuals and philosopher, is not akin to the trascendental Knowledge you're truly seeking.
All I gather from your text is that you can't conceive creation out of nothing therefore it's not real.
Creating out of nothing is not causality.
The first "creatura ex nihilo" is The Law of Causality. This was the first cause and the first effect. The first act, before actions were a thing; an act of inventiveness that while being invented invented inventiveness. How can humans even speak of this?
*What caused causality if causality must have been caused for causality to have been caused?*
There was no “before logic” - logic has always existed, grounded in God. I think once you understand what it means for one thing to depend on another, it turns out that the universe both does and doesn’t depend on God, constitutively.
The universe must be fully dependent on God given creation ex nihilo because God is the only being for things possibly be grounded in. Yet, if the universe doesn’t constitutively depend on God, then the universe is independent of God in *that* respect. So there is one way in which the universe is not dependent on God. So the universe is fully dependent on God and not fully dependent on God.
Contradictions are not things we should want to be committed to. So best off ditching creation ex nihilo. Other models of God are available and should be preferred on this basis- like pantheism and panentheism
I don’t think anyone can conceive of creation from nothing, and that’s part of the problem. People can state it, sure. But I’m confident that the doctrine is incoherent. I think the doctrine arose in the first instance because of some pseudo problems about the creator/creature distinction that we are better off ignoring.
If you disagree with my argument then I’m happy to take substantive disagreement seriously. But cheap shots like “you don’t understand x” without engaging with the argument won’t fly here. I understand it just fine!
God created all things visible and invisible, including logic. How can you talk of metaphysical dependencies while talking about operations that occur to create such concepts? What can you logically say about that which happened before logic was a thing?
You've hit the limit of logical thinking. It's your call if you want to keep manipulating sets of abstract symbols or if you want to actually know something.
3 is of course the error. A creation of a creation is dependent on the original creator and can be said to come from in in the same way.
But notice my conclusion follows from:
1* Whatever is created ex nihilo is not completely metaphysically dependent on God (i.e. it is at least partially metaphysically independent)
Whichever part is independent has nothing to do with God’s creative act. So this is a straight-up rejection of creation ex nihilo.
The part in question is the stuff of which the universes is constituted. So it’s a logically inescapable dilemma unfortunately.
I *grant* those things for arguments sake, but you don’t need to assume any of those things for the argument to work. An atheist (who might disagree with all of those) can still run the argument because it is an internal critique of a certain kind of theism.
Are you defending creation ex nihilo here or are you rejecting theism? I can’t tell from your last comment.
It sounds like you reject philosophical metaphysics as a discipline. No worries, happy to agree to disagree there. This argument is analytic so it’s the kind of thing that’s supposed to be true or false by definition. You don’t need anything other than definitions to run an argument like this.
I still don’t know if you’re objecting because you think God can create stuff ex nihilo, or if you’re coming from an atheistic angle.